Oil spill panel calls for tighter federal rules, new fees for drilling

The presidential oil spill commission said Tuesday that the federal government should require tougher regulation, stiffer fines and a new industry-run safety organization, recommendations that face an uncertain future in the new Congress.

Former senator Bob Graham (D-Fla.), one of the commission's co-chairmen, said that the Deepwater Horizon accident was "both foreseeable and preventable," and that Congress and the administration needed to enact reforms in order to prevent a repeat of the massive BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico last year.

"I am sad to say that part of the answer is the fact that our government helped let it happen," Graham said. "Our regulators were consistently outmatched."

The panel proposed several safeguards aimed at strengthening regulators' control over the oil and gas industry, including establishing an independent safety agency within the Interior Department that would be headed by someone for a fixed term in order to insulate the appointee from political interference. Graham said such a person should have "a background of both science and management."

It also called for funding the regulatory agency that oversees offshore drilling, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE), with fees from the companies who are tapping into the nation's petroleum resource.

William K. Reilly, the commission's other co-chairman, emphasized that it would be a mistake to focus just on the three companies involved in last year's accident. "The solution to the problem has to be industry-wide."

Graham, who along with Reilly will testify before both the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the House Natural Resources Committee on Jan. 26, said he hoped the "searing impact" of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and its aftermath would "override an ideological preference for less government, less government intrusion and less government cost" that could impede legislative action.

Both Louisiana Sens. Mary Landrieu (D) and David Vitter (R) endorsed the panel's recommendation that 80 percent of the Clean Water Act fines and penalties linked to the Gulf of Mexico oil spill go to environmental restoration. Landrieu said it would give "added ammunition" to a proposal that already has White House support.

But in a sign of how the two parties remain divided on how to regulate drilling, Landrieu said the report found a path forward for deepwater drilling while Vitter criticized it for failing to do so.

"The report could have easily said 'end of deepwater drilling,' but it doesn't," Landrieu told reporters in a conference call. "I think that's the really big takeaway - that this commission, having examined a horrible incident that occurred, has basically concluded that deepwater can be done safely."

In an interview, Vitter said he was concerned the report "didn't make any statement, any observation about the gulf still almost being shut down, nine months after the fact."

He added that although he was open to creating a new safety office within Interior, and didn't object outright to the idea of imposing fees to help regulate offshore energy exploration, he lacked confidence in the administration's ability to oversee drilling operations.

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Increase in oil revenue amid unrest in Arab world gives Russia some breathing room

MOSCOW - With the price of oil climbing to more than $100 a barrel, Russia has a little more weight to throw around on the world stage, and it is doing just that.

The stepped-up flow of petrodollars into the government's coffers relieves what had been a worrisome budget deficit and lessens the urgency of reform. Good relations with the West - and especially the "reset" with Washington - are not quite so pressing when the economy here is in good shape.

Russia is benefiting tangibly from the turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa. Urals crude sold for $113 this week, up from $75 a year ago. Of that, $76.50 goes into the Russian treasury. And the spike in oil income has compensated for growing weakness elsewhere. It arrived just as Gazprom - the natural-gas giant that until recently was a potent weapon in Russia's foreign policy - has seen its clout in Europe washing away amid a flood of competition.

An emboldened Prime Minister Vladimir Putin was in Brussels in late February angrily lecturing the Europeans on energy policy and the uprisings in the Arab world. After months in which Moscow and Washington have tried to put their differences over Georgia on a back burner, President Dmitry Medvedev two weeks ago accused the country of threatening the security of the 2014 Winter Olympics, to be held in Sochi, near the border of a breakaway region of Georgia.

Earlier this year, Russia's warming relations with Poland went sour over the handling of the investigation into the plane crash that killed Poland's president and other top leaders this past spring.

But with increased oil revenue also comes the danger of complacency. Bureaucrats, defense contractors, pensioners and workers in construction and finance all stand to gain from the money coming in, along with the oil companies. But the cash also feeds corruption, encourages increased financial opacity and discourages attempts to shake up the system - all of which could spell trouble for Russia down the road.

"All of the dominant groups in Russia get a share of the increased oil revenue," said Alexander Auzan, an economist and adviser to Medvedev. "Yet it contradicts their long-term interests."

Largest oil producer

It's a powerful prop for the status quo - which Auzan and others say is unsustainable.

But as Sergei Guriev, head of the New Economic School in Moscow, pointed out, any change is going to involve a cost for someone, so why take the risk if the money is flowing in?

Russia is currently the world's largest oil producer. When the price last spiked, in 2007, Moscow was flooded with money and people close to Putin were suggesting that Russia was genuinely self-sufficient and had no need to engage more deeply with the West. The economic crisis the following year brought that talk to an abrupt end, and Medvedev began pushing for a Western-oriented program of modernization and diversification away from dependence on energy exports.

The Kremlin moved to stimulate the economy in 2008 by increasing government salaries and hiking pensions by 35 percent. Now it is stuck with those increases. With oil revenue providing 40 percent of the Russian budget, the Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy here has calculated that at any price less than $105 a barrel the government will be in the red.

That tempers any inclination toward hubris, said Daniel Treisman, a political scientist at UCLA who follows Russian developments. The Kremlin was looking at a difficult financial crunch, with parliamentary elections coming late this year and a presidential election next March, so the timing of this rise in revenue is more a relief than a goad to aggressive behavior.

"We don't need high prices," said Leonid Grigoriev, an economist and former World Bank adviser. "We need good relations, a long-term market and reasonable prices," which he put in the $70-to-$90 range.

Russia will not turn its back on the West, by any means, he said. But, especially in an election year, its leaders may be more vocal in pointing up differences with the West. In 2010, Russia had enough problems at home that it was actively trying to avoid them abroad; now, with money to address domestic issues, that caution may not be so evident.

Treisman, like many others, did not think much would ever come of Medvedev's modernization plans - it's not the sort of change, he said, that can be ordered from the top down. But the oil bulge makes the Westernization of the Russian economy less likely. It helps big companies - which, Grigoriev said, already dominate the economy to a much greater extent than in other developed countries - and it hurts small ones, where jobs and creativity tend to be nurtured.

Information technology firms, with high labor costs, will suffer, Guriev said, and they are central to Medvedev's vision for the future of Russia.

Gazprom loses clout

Part of what got Putin so riled up in Brussels was Europe's treatment of Gazprom, a gigantic state-owned operation that at one time had unchallenged sway in the European energy market. Gazprom was a powerful tool in the Kremlin's hands, useful when threatening Ukraine and a reminder to the rest of Europe that Russia had to be given its due.

But that was before American companies began extracting cheap natural gas from shale deposits, and before developments in liquefied natural gas (LNG) technology made inexpensive transportation by ship possible.

Qatar set up a new LNG port to ship gas to the United States, but when it couldn't compete there it turned to Europe instead. Today, Europe can buy gas cheaper from Qatar than it can get by pipeline from Russia. European companies have been renegotiating their contracts with Gazprom - downward - and the European Union has insisted that Gazprom divest itself of its pipelines.

Russia will still sell gas to Europe, said Pierre Noel, an energy expert at England's University of Cambridge, "but the pricing regime is changing." Gazprom, he said, will eventually have to change with it.

But the turmoil in North Africa has temporarily masked even Gazprom's difficulties. When the Libyan gas pipeline across the Mediterranean was shut down, Italy, which is Gazprom's second-biggest customer, relented for now in trying to renegotiate its contract.

If production in Algeria, a much bigger supplier than Libya, were to be disrupted, that would make Gazprom a power to be reckoned with again.

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Freak accident or frontier enterprise? Deep-water drilling is still a big unknown.

BP's internal report on the causes of the Deepwater Horizon blowout, released earlier this month, summarized the calamity as the result of eight separate breaches of physical and operational barriers, any one of which could have, and should have, stopped the unfolding disaster. The blowout, in the BP scenario, was very much a freak event. A long shot.

A graphic in the report showed the barriers arrayed like eight slices of Swiss cheese. All the holes, the report states, "lined up" to enable the blowout:

"[A] complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments, engineering design, operational implementation and team interfaces came together to allow the initiation and escalation of the accident."

There is a different, and simpler, way to describe what happened: They weren't careful enough.

For the can-do culture of petroleum engineers, this catastrophe should heighten respect for the way bad things can happen to what looks like proven technology. Oil drilling is a risky business, and deep-water drilling is riskier still. Depth matters. And as the industry went deeper, it didn't commensurately increase its safety margin -- or prepare for the worst-case scenario.

On land, on sea, in the air, in space, in our laboratories, on our farms, we are surrounded by technologies of increasing complexity, all of them vulnerable, at some level, to catastrophes of human origin. Engineers do amazing things, but they aren't always as smart as they think, nor their systems as robust as they seem on paper.

The more complex the job, the more potential infiltration points for gremlins.

"We believed that the blowout preventer was the ultimate fail-safe mechanism," BP CEO Tony Hayward testified before Congress in June, bringing to mind the captain of the Titanic, believing that his ship was unsinkable.

Charles Perrow, in his seminal book on technological disasters, "Normal Accidents," writes, "We have produced designs so complicated that we cannot anticipate all the possible interactions of the inevitable failures; we add safety devices" -- think blowout preventers -- "that are deceived or avoided or defeated by hidden paths in the system."

His argument is that such accidents, though rare, are integral characteristics of the system, with its interlinked components. That's what happened here.

The pivotal moment came late on the afternoon and into the early evening of April 20. The Horizon crew conducted two pressure tests to look for any signs of hydrocarbons flowing in the well, which had already been cemented. For reasons that remain somewhat murky -- most of the key figures either have refused to testify or died in the explosion -- the BP "company man" and the Transocean crew decided that the results of the pressure tests were benign.

As in many industrial accidents involving complex technology, they were trying to interpret something they couldn't see directly -- what was happening below the bottom of the sea. The critical hardware, the blowout preventer, was a mile deep.

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In its report on the gulf oil spill, BP spreads the blame

BP rolled out the results Wednesday of a four-month internal investigation into the causes of the April 20 blowout of its Macondo oil well in the Gulf of Mexico, spreading blame among its contractors and giving a glimpse of the defenses it might deploy in public and in court.

The much-anticipated report asserted that a "complex and interlinked series" of failures - of equipment, engineering and judgment - led to the surge of oil and gas that exploded on the deck of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, killing 11 people, sinking the rig and triggering the worst oil spill in U.S. history.

The report was written by a team of 50 internal and external experts led by the company's head of safety and operations, Mark Bly, and the rollout Wednesday morning at a hotel in downtown Washington was labeled a "technical briefing."

But the document inevitably carries a heavy public relations element as well as legal and financial implications for BP. It arrives as the Justice Department is weighing whether to bring charges of criminal negligence against BP that could sharply increase the cost of the spill for the London-based oil giant and provide fodder for private lawsuits.

In addition, there is legislation in Congress that would effectively strip BP of the right to drill in the Gulf of Mexico. The company is haggling with the Obama administration over what pieces of collateral to offer while it is financing the $20 billion escrow fund that will be used to pay claims. And BP's main partner in the well, Anadarko Petroleum, has declared that it won't pay its share of the cleanup costs and claims because it views BP's well design and actions as reckless.

The BP report makes the case for "shared responsibility," saying that "no single factor" caused the blowout. It points to multiple failures by its contractors in maintenance, equipment and planning.

The investigation found fault with the recipe Halliburton used in its cement, with the flaps on a Weatherford International barrier device known as a float collar, and with the condition of hydraulic lines and batteries that might have sapped power from the blowout preventer made by Cameron International and operated by Transocean, making it impossible to clamp and cut through steel piping.

"Transocean was solely responsible for operation of the drilling rig and for operations safety," the report says in an appendix. "It was required to maintain well control equipment and use all reasonable means to control and prevent fire and blowouts."

The report also said Transocean and BP rig leaders jointly "reached the incorrect view" on well tests in the crucial hours before the explosion. And Bly said BP needs to reexamine the way it oversees work by its contractors.

BP's design not faulted

Yet the report absolves BP's widely criticized well design. It says the path that oil and gas followed as they escaped from the well meant that the well's casing and design - matters that could otherwise implicate BP - were not factors in the disaster. Instead, it says that if any one of eight failures of equipment or decision-making had not taken place, the blowout would not have happened.

The report not only offers new details and analysis of what went wrong, it also represents a bold declaration that BP is not going to assume more than what it considers its share of the blame for the accident. The report did not say how far up the BP corporate ladder the well problems went, and no employee was named or punished.

In a news release, BP chief executive Tony Hayward, who has barely spoken publicly since his disastrous congressional testimony in June, did not offer anything resembling a mea culpa.

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Suit alleges BP cut back on safety before oil spill

The New York State comptroller, the Ohio state pension funds and other large investors have alleged that BP made cost-saving cutbacks in its safety operations prior to last year's major oil spill and that it disregarded safety warnings from its own managers.

The new documents in a securities fraud class action suit allege that the company "terminated" Curtis Jackson, then a senior manager for Gulf of Mexico operations, and Phil Dziubinski, a senior safety official at BP Alaska who warned of worker fatigue from extensive overtime.

Dziubinski's quarrel with BP was described earlier in the Wall Street Journal, which said he and BP had reached a confidential settlement.

The new filing also says that Kevin Lacy, described as BP's senior vice president for drilling operations in the Gulf of Mexico, resigned in late 2009 "because of disagreements with BP over its lack of commitment to process safety." The lawsuit says that Lacy had been recruited from Chevron to improve BP's drilling protocols.

BP spokesman Scott Dean said the company would not comment on pending litigation.

The investors, represented by the firms Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll of Washington and Berman DeValerio of Boston, produced what they said was an internal BP document that said: "It's become apparent that process-safety major hazards and risks are not fully understood by engineering or line operating personnel. Insufficient awareness is leading to missed signals that precede incidents and response after incidents, both of which increases the potential for and severity of process-safety related incidents."

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