As the green economy grows, the 'dirty rich' are fading away

So the blown-out oil well in the gulf has finally stopped gushing, plugged with heavy mud and awaiting the ultimate "kill" by a relief well. Yet, even with the largest oil spill in the nation's history in the background, what seems to have been killed much more quickly is Washington's will to take meaningful action on the environment. After axing climate-change legislation in late July, the Senate is now taking up a modest energy bill -- and even that effort may go nowhere.

Hopes for a pivotal BP-driven eco-moment -- remember President Obama's call in June for a new "national mission" to get America off fossil fuels? -- have dissipated, seemingly confirming the common view that powerful energy firms, and corporate America more broadly, stand as the sworn enemies of any bold new environmental rules and that they have the clout to get their way.

Except that old view is no longer quite right. In fact, big business is more divided on energy and the environment than ever before, and the growing rift reflects major power shifts in the economy. On one side are business leaders and shareholders who derive their wealth from resource extraction, fossil-fuel-based power generation and energy-intensive manufacturing -- they are the "dirty rich." On the other are business leaders who run knowledge or service companies that generate very little pollution -- the "clean rich."

The dirty rich are dying off, and the clean rich are coming of age.

Of course, the dirty rich still have enough juice on Capitol Hill to kill bills they don't like, or to neuter the federal watchdogs who oversee deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico and coal mining in West Virginia. ExxonMobil, for example, is not just the second-largest American corporation; it also has the some of the deepest pockets for lobbying, spending $27.4 million on such activities in 2009, more than any other company.

But the larger transition is clear: America is witnessing the twilight of the dirty rich and the inexorable move of economic power to the clean rich. What's more, environmental values are spreading fast through affluent America, with more super-wealthy individuals putting their money behind green causes and more upscale voters expecting government action to protect the planet. Climate legislation may be dead for now, but if big money really talks in America, the long-term prospects for tougher environmental rules would seem quite good.

It is hard to understate how dramatically the sources of business wealth have shifted in the past half-century. Of the top 20 companies on the Fortune 500 list in 1960, 16 were engaged in heavy industry, such as U.S. Steel and DuPont, or resource extraction, such as Texaco and Mobil. This year's list includes just six such companies in the top 20. And two of them, GM and Ford, have been in decline for years.

Meanwhile, the dirty rich are fading from the Forbes 400 list of the wealthiest individuals. When the list was first published in 1982, 38 percent of its members had made their fortunes in oil and manufacturing, and 12 percent in finance and technology. By 2006, those ratios had nearly flipped: 36 percent of the richest Americans made their wealth from finance and tech, while 17 percent earned it from manufacturing and oil.

The dirty-rich billionaires on the Forbes list are mostly on the older side -- such as industrialists David and Charles Koch, both in their 70s. In March, one of the nation's richest oilmen, pipeline magnate Dan Duncan, died at the age of 77. Among recent newcomers to the list, few have been from dirty industries. More typical is Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg, who made the list in 2008 at age 24.

Even Texas doesn't have as many dirty rich as it used to. Fewer than half of the state's billionaires made their money in oil or energy, a major departure from earlier patterns. The two wealthiest Texans today are not oilmen; they are Alice Walton, an heir to the Wal-Mart fortune, followed by Michael Dell, a computer entrepreneur. Dell doesn't live in either of the traditional oil-money cities, Houston and Dallas; he resides in Austin, which has grown more influential in the state's cultural and political life as it has become home to numerous high-tech entrepreneurs. Dallas still has plenty of conservative oil money, but the city's economy is now powered by tech, finance and services. If the primetime soap opera "Dallas" were remade today, J.R. Ewing would probably be a telecom magnate.

The same pattern holds elsewhere. The great fortunes of Colorado used to be made from oil or mining, and the state's politicians were often creatures of these industries and unfriendly to environmentalists. Now the state's super-rich are a very different breed, including satellite TV mogul Charles Ergen and Quark founder Tim Gill. In the early 1980s, the only Forbes 400 member from the Pacific Northwest was a timber baron. Today a half-dozen billionaires live in the region, and most made their money in technology. California's Santa Clara County, which covers Silicon Valley, now has more millionaires than Manhattan.

This seismic shift in who gets rich is fast changing where politicians get their money and whom they listen to. A torrent of new cash has flowed into politics from the finance, tech and entertainment industries, and especially from the legal profession, which gave twice as much to national candidates in 2008 as any other sector. Dirty industries that once wielded enormous clout on Capitol Hill -- such as autos, steel and mining -- aren't the players they once were. Political contributions from the entire coal industry amounted to $3.5 million in 2008, while Microsoft employees contributed $3.3 million.

In 2008, John McCain far outraised Obama among employees of energy and natural resources companies, pulling in $4 million from this group. Not bad, except that Obama bested McCain in the communications and electronics sector five to one, raising $25.5 million. Until the 2002 election, the oil and gas industry -- long a deep well of GOP cash -- was consistently among the top 10 sources of money for federal candidates, according to the Center for Responsive Politics. In 2008, it ranked 16th. That same year, the entire energy and natural resources sector gave $77 million in campaign donations -- compared with $234 million given by lawyers.

The picture looks quite different when it comes to money for lobbying, with dirty industries still among the biggest spenders in Washington. But the winds may be shifting in this area as well: The once-feared automotive industry is now so weak that Detroit could barely swing a bailout last year and watched helplessly in late 2008 as its greatest champion in Congress, Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.), was ousted from a powerful chairmanship by Rep. Henry Waxman (D-Calif.), a strong environmentalist.

Of course, new-economy giants such as Hewlett-Packard have faced withering criticism of their environmental records, and the pollution from high-tech products can certainly be serious. The difference, however, is scale. While Google's servers gobble up vast amounts of energy, its products exist mainly as pixels on a screen. BlackBerrys and iPhones are pocket-size, and desktop computers, which are among the larger products of the Information Age, weigh a few hundred times less than an automobile.

Other knowledge industries, such as the legal profession, are about monetizing cognitive skills and have little to do with the old-economy model of converting natural resources into wealth. So some of the fastest-growing and richest parts of the economy aren't much affected by environmental laws -- which is why a growing slice of America's business elite has little incentive to battle them.

What's more, an ever-larger contingent of clean-tech entrepreneurs and investors will score big if Congress acts to push up the price of carbon. Last year, George Soros pledged to make $1 billion in renewable-energy investments. Other billionaires, including Warren Buffett, Bill Gates, John Doerr and Vinod Khosla, are also placing major bets in this sector.

Apart from self-interest, many of the clean rich care about the environment. They tend to be highly educated, and quite a few have scientific training. They understand that climate change is real and must be addressed now. Google, which is run by three computer scientists, set out to be carbon-neutral several years ago and says it has achieved that goal. The company even helps employees to buy hybrid vehicles. Intel co-founder Gordon Moore -- a chemist by training -- is giving hundreds of millions of dollars to help preserve fragile ecosystems.

But the roots of the clean rich go deeper. The modern environmental movement emerged in the 1960s, fueled in large part by the spread of affluence and education. There is a logic to that link: Once your material needs are met, you can turn your attention to other concerns, whether saving polar bears or the Amazon. "Postmodern values give priority to environmental protection and cultural issues," University of Michigan political scientist Ronald Inglehart has written, "even when these goals conflict with maximizing economic growth."

Inglehart bases this conclusion on decades of research through the World Values Survey, which has tracked changing attitudes in 97 countries. His findings consistently show that rising incomes and more wealth lead to environmentalism. That certainly seemed the case in 2006, when Californians voted on Proposition 87, which would have taxed oil companies to fund alternative fuels. The initiative, which failed overall, passed in higher-income counties, such as Marin and Alameda, while losing by huge margins in some of the state's poorest counties. In Modoc County, a rural area with the one of the lowest household income levels in California, only 24 percent of voters supported the initiative, compared with 72 percent in prosperous San Francisco County.

It is hardly news that affluent liberals often fret more about the environment than working-class voters. But this class divide is poised to have a larger political impact. One reason the Republican Party can blithely block attempts to address climate change, one of the gravest threats facing humanity, is that its political base is heavily weighted with less-educated and less affluent voters who live in rural areas and small towns -- and who aren't keen on government activism to protect the planet. A poll last year by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, for instance, found that support for legislation to limit carbon emissions was 16 points higher among college graduates than those with a high school diploma or less.

Yet if the GOP is to build a durable majority, it will have to move beyond this constituency. Even if Republicans take control of the House this fall, that won't change the fact that the Palin and Limbaugh wing of the party has badly hurt GOP fortunes by alienating affluent and educated donors and voters -- as witnessed most dramatically by Obama's crushing fundraising edge over McCain. Wooing back these natural allies, especially the clean rich, will require tacking to the center. And climate change, an issue driven by scientific evidence and with appeal in this newly influential community, is a great candidate for a softened stance. Its time will come soon -- and could come even faster if a few far-sighted Republicans recognize their plight and decide to hasten that transformation.

dcallahan@demos.org

David Callahan is a senior fellow at Demos, a nonprofit public policy group, and the author of "Fortunes of Change: The Rise of the Liberal Rich and the Remaking of America."


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BP, Transocean, Halliburton blamed by presidential Gulf oil spill commission

The presidential oil spill commission on Wednesday blamed the Gulf of Mexico oil spill last year on "missteps and oversights" by oil giant BP, rig owner Transocean and contractor Halliburton, saying those errors were "rooted in systemic failures" and could happen again.

The commission said that the April 20 blowout at BP's Macondo well was not inevitable, but rather a failure of management in which officials from all three firms ignored critical warning signs and failed to take precautions that might have delayed the completion of the well but also might have averted the environmental disaster.

In a chapter released from the final report due out next week, the commission said: "The blowout was not the product of a series of aberrational decisions made by rogue industry or government officials that could not have been anticipated or expected to occur again. Rather, the root causes are systemic and, absent significant reform in both industry practices and government policies, might well recur."

The document provided a detailed account of the missteps that led to the spill, but most of the details have been revealed in other reports or investigations so far. It recounts fateful decisions by all three major corporate actors, including the failure to use enough centralizers to keep the pipe in the middle of the well, choices about the type of steel pipe used, and failure to heed or share test results suggesting that the cement used to seal the well could fail.

In the case of the failure to use enough centralizers, the report said that "the evidence to date does not unequivocally establish whether" that was a "direct cause" of the blowout, but the commission said that it "illuminates the flaws in BP's management and design procedures, as well as poor communication between BP and Halliburton."

The commission report also cited a Dec. 23, 2009, North Sea incident on one of Transocean's rigs, which the commission said was an "eerily similar near-miss" to what happened at the Macondo well. Though Transocean told the commission the incident was irrelevant, the commission said, "The basic facts of both incidents are the same. Had the rig crew been adequately informed of the prior event and trained on its lessons, events at Macondo may have unfolded very differently."

William K. Reilly, co-chairman of the commission appointed by President Obama, said that the commission had concluded that the blowout reflected "a more pervasive problem" within the oil industry.

"Given the documented failings of both Transocean and Halliburton, both of which serve the offshore industry in virtually every ocean, I reluctantly conclude we have a system-wide problem," Reilly said.

Former senator and commission co-chair Bob Graham stressed the failure of regulators. He said, "The Macondo blowout was the product of several individual missteps and oversights by BP, Halliburton and Transocean, which government regulators lacked the authority, the necessary resources and the technical expertise to prevent."

The Interior Department issued a statement saying that it has "already identified, acknowledged, and spent months working aggressively to reform" offshore drilling. It said it would "continue to make the changes necessary to restore the American people's confidence in the safety and environmental soundness of oil and gas drilling and production on the Outer Continental Shelf."

Last May, President Obama appointed Reilly and Graham to oversee the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling and gave them a January 2011 deadline to submit a report. Unlike Congress, the Justice Department or other probes, the oil spill commission lacked subpoena power but still sought to uncover the reasons for the disaster. It also criticized federal regulators and some Obama administration members for their response to the spill.

But the most detailed descriptions in the chapter released Wednesday were of communications and decisions by BP, Transocean and Halliburton.

"The immediate cause of the Macondo blowout was a failure to contain hydrocarbon pressures in the well," the report said. "Three things could have contained those pressures: the cement at the bottom of the well, the mud in the well and in the riser, and the blowout preventer. But mistakes and failures to appreciate risk compromised each of those potential barriers, steadily depriving the rig crew of safeguards until the blowout was inevitable and, at the very end, uncontrollable."

The report highlighted a series of decisions that led to time-saving and cost-saving measures when alternatives were available. Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) said the report showed "that the underlying profits-over-safety pathology may be in temporary remission, but not fully cured."

The report said, "Most of the mistakes and oversights at Macondo can be traced back to a single overarching failure - a failure of management."

BP said it supports the commission's efforts and "is working with regulators and the industry to ensure that the lessons learned from Macondo lead to improvements in operations and contractor services in deepwater drilling." It said that it has already "instituted significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk management."

Transocean, meanwhile, sought to place blame with BP and regulators. "Consistent with industry standards, the procedures being conducted in the final hours were crafted and directed by BP engineers and approved in advance by federal regulators," the company said in a statement. "Based on the limited information made available to them, the Transocean crew took appropriate actions to gain control of the well. They were well trained and considered to be among the best in the business."

Halliburton issued a statement sharply criticizing the presidential commission and BP. It blamed BP for failing to run a cement bond log test, which it called "the only means to test the integrity of the cement bond." It said "had BP properly interpreted the negative tests, the tests would have revealed any problems with the cement job." The company also reiterated disputes about the commission's description of February and April lab tests of cement mixtures as failures, and asserted that Halliburton's engineer on the Deepwater Horizon rig had received notice of satisfactory test results. Halliburton also accused the commission of having "selectively omitted information we provided to them."


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Oil spill dumped 4.9 million barrels into Gulf of Mexico, latest measure shows

The blown-out well in the Gulf of Mexico gushed 12 times faster than the government and BP estimated in the early weeks of the crisis and has spilled a whopping 4.9 million barrels, or 205.8 million gallons, according to a more detailed analysis announced late Monday.

BP's Macondo well spewed 62,000 barrels of oil a day initially, and as the reservoir gradually depleted itself, the flow eased to 53,000 barrels a day until the well was finally capped and sealed July 15, according to scientists in the Flow Rate Technical Group, supervised by the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Department of Energy.

The new numbers once again have nudged upward the statistical scale of the disaster. If correct -- the government allows for a margin of error of 10 percent -- the flow rate would make this spill significantly larger than the Ixtoc I blowout of 1979, which polluted the southern Gulf of Mexico with 138 million gallons over the course of 10 months. That had been the largest unintentional oil spill in history, surpassed only by the intentional spills in 1991 during the Persian Gulf War.

The new flow rate figures came as engineers made final preparations for a "static kill" operation that might plug the well permanently even before a relief well intercepts Macondo at its base. BP announced late Monday that the procedure would be delayed, probably until Tuesday, because of a leak in the hydraulic control system on the well's new cap.

(Photos: Oil spills through history)

Macondo's flow rate has been a major source of controversy since the April 20 explosion on the Deepwater Horizon. Early in the crisis, the Coast Guard and BP pegged the flow at 5,000 barrels a day, sticking with that figure even as outside scientists declared that it low-balled the actual rate. The flow rate team, assembled in May, tried to come up with a more solid figure. Scientists examining the surface slick as well as video taken by submersibles soon upped the estimate; by early June, the government declared the flow to be 35,000 to 60,000 barrels a day.

Even the high end of that estimate did not quite do justice to Macondo when it was at full throttle in the early weeks of the crisis. The new figures reflect more data, including high-definition video, sonar measurements of the oil-gas ratio, and pressure readings in the new capping stack before, and then after, the sealing of the well July 15.

"We may never know the exact answer. But as we get more data, you're able to shrink the uncertainty," said Bill Lehr, senior scientist for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and a leader of one of the teams.

The new figures indicate that the roughly 800,000 barrels of oil that BP managed to capture with its various containment strategies -- a riser insertion tool, a "top hat," and flaring from a surface rig -- represented only about one-sixth of the crude that surged into the gulf over the course of nearly three months. In all, about 1.2 million barrels of oil have been accounted for, either burned, captured or skimmed off the ocean's surface. That's about a quarter of the new estimate for the total spill.

Where the other three-quarters has gone is unclear. Some has evaporated; some has been consumed by microbes; but scientists remain troubled by the possibility that large amounts of oil remain underwater in cloudlike plumes.

"This further confirms that a lot of the oil is still at sea. And we just don't know the implications of it," said Ron Kendall, director of the Institute of Environmental and Human Health at Texas Tech University. Kendall will testify before Congress on Wednesday about his fears that dispersant chemicals have helped much of this oil sink into deep-sea habitats.

For government lawyers preparing a case against BP, this number could help calculate the maximum civil penalty BP might face for the spill. If BP is not found to have acted with negligence, the penalty would be $1,100 per barrel. About 4.1 million barrels escaped into the gulf, according to the new estimate, so that fine would come to $4.5 billion. If BP is found to have acted with "gross negligence" in the lead-up to the spill, the maximum penalty would be $4,300 a barrel, which would work out to $17.6 billion.

"You've got to go in with a number," said David Uhlmann, a law professor at the University of Michigan and the former chief of the Justic Department's Environmental Crimes Section. "And I think these numbers strengthen the government's hand," compared with previous estimates that produced only a range.

In all, the 4.1 million barrels estimated to have polluted the gulf would be enough to fill the Pentagon to a depth of 18 feet or to fill 260 Olympic swimming pools. The entire Gulf of Mexico, by comparison, would fill 880 million Pentagons, or 973 billion Olympic pools.

John Amos at SkyTruth, an organization that uses satellite imagery to study environmental problems, said that this new figure showed how far off BP and the Coast Guard were in the crucial days at the beginning of the spill.

"When the next spill happens, being in the right order of magnitude with the spill estimate is going to be important," he said.

The well remains pressurized and dangerous, but BP and government officials hope that will change with the static kill attempt. The goal is to inject mud into the well and drive the oil back to the source rock.

First comes what BP calls an injectivity test. Mud will be pumped into the well from a surface ship at a gentle rate of one barrel a minute, then two barrels a minute, then three, as engineers monitor pressures and look for signs that the rogue oil is being forced back into the source rock 2 1/2 miles below the seafloor.

"We want to confirm that we can inject the oil that's in the well bore back into the reservoir," BP Senior Vice President Kent Wells told reporters Monday.


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